An Atalanta Football Philosophy: More Safety at the Back

Introduction
Part 1 – Velocity
Part 2 – Pressing

The first two parts of the tactical series laid out a plan to leverage possession velocity, by creating opportunities that shorten the pitch, cause confusion in defensive transition, and permit the offense to strike quickly.  Its neither a revolutionary strategy, nor one too different from what Atalanta employs right now.  And while Atalanta may benefit from some more strategic pressing and faster outlets when it does win the ball back, minor tweaks could have the offense humming given the personnel at Gian Piero Gasperini’s disposal.  However, this new philosophy is incomplete without raising the question of how to react to the inevitable moment when the opposition beats the press and forces Atalanta into defense mode.

Everyone who has watched Atalanta knows the high-risk nature of its setup, and why most of all the goals the club concede seem to be high chance opportunities often with favorable numbers moving forward for the opposition.  It’s the nature of the beast, you live and die by the sword.  In a system that lives and breathes by trying to smother opponents in its own half, there are bound to be opportunities where Atalanta will show chinks in its defensive armor and balls get through onto Juan Musso in nearly unstoppable one on one opportunities.

Even with his shot stopping chops, Atalanta’s defense could do him a solid on occasion

Take your pick of goals conceded this year – there are far too many that just leave us as fans scratching our heads.  Poorly played passes, mis-dribbles, lapses in position, every type of error has bitten Atalanta this year.  However, on average, two traits all of these snafus appear to have in common are they result from a loss in possession and all the plays work back into the middle of the pitch.

Among all the goals conceded so far this year, let’s look at four that sting hard, and perhaps (I say perhaps!) could have been avoided with a potential safety valve at the back.  Please keep in my mind that the commentary is by no means a criticism of the players – looking at everything through hindsight is unfair.  Nonetheless there are plenty of good lessons that can still be learned from analyzing errors that lead to a more cohesive defensive unit.

1. Sampdoria, Goalscorer: Francesco Caputo – Caputo’s opening goal against Atalanta results from a bit of bouncing luck off the heel of Jose Luis Palomino, leaving Caputo wide open to run in alone on Musso.  This is a tough goal to rewatch.  Besides the breakaway, Matteo Lovato and Palomino are far too close to each other in the press, and worst of all Davide Zappacosta’s lack of positional awareness permits Caputo to remain onside.

Lesson Learned: The offside trap must be on point when playing such an aggressive press.  If there is a lack of communication in such a setup, teams will try to feast on the ball over the top because there will be more opportunities to be kept onside by a less disciplined defensive shape.

2. AC Milan, Goalscorer: Sandro Tonali – This may be the most unforgivable goal conceded of the season so far.  Remo Freuler lost his head just for a second, and without any backup his brain fart permitted Tonali to casually walk in on goal.

Lesson Learned: Always recognize if you’re man between the keeper and the opposition.  Atalanta was already in high-risk mode at this junction of the match, but there still is very little reason for Freuler to have his back to goal with no one besides Juan Musso to receive a pass.

3. Cagliari, Goalscorer: Joao Pedro – Merih Demiral’s shaky pass leads to a turnover, but more importantly puts him out of position to properly defend a streaking Pedro.  This goal took a lot of skill from both Diego Godin and Pedro, but since everything was flowing through the middle of the pitch made it much more difficult to defend when Demiral was supposed to be the last man.

Lesson Learned: Demiral was inching up the field, and Marten de Roon took too long to get back to cover the open area.  As a result, he left the center of the pitch open for a hustling Pedro to run into a nifty pass that could have been cut out with more anticipation.

4. Villarreal, Goalscorer: Arnaut Danjuma – Merih Demiral shows up again, with his bad touch and then freezing like a deer in the headlights leaves acres of space for Danjuma to run in behind unmarked.

Lesson Learned: Besides Demiral’s puzzling mistake, the entire defense was standing flatfooted.  Even with Demiral moving forward, which was not necessarily a bad thing, both Marten de Roon and Rafael Toloi offered no cover at the back, neither of tracked back quick enough to take up Demiral’s vacant position as the last man.

A Solution That Dates Back a Few Decades

So what’s the moral of the story here?  Positioning, brain farts, and bad passes are all the unintended consequences of a high press, but something must be done to negate their undesirable effects.  It begs the question, does a team really need all ten outfield players dedicated wholeheartedly to the press?  Probably not, and in fact Atalanta really doesn’t play like that right now.  Duvan Zapata or another central forward is not too often engaged in Atalanta’s press.  So why not move the transition duties up the pitch, getting the central forward more involved in hassling the defense, and leaving more room for a defender to roam around however the game dictates.

I’ll introduce football’s version of the free safety; and for the NFL fans in the audience, Atalanta’s version of Ed Reed.  Or if we want to keep the terminology in Italy, we’ll take a step back in time and bring back some hybrid version of a libero.  I may be exposing my lack of football history knowledge, but the libero has fallen out of favor in football, especially as more teams have moved to a two central defender setup and moving a playmaker a bit further up the pitch.

Translate to en:] Franz Beckenbauer in der HALL OF FAME des deutschen  Fußballs ⚽
Franz Beckenbauer was one of the first to identify with the libero role

Atalanta’s version of the free safety wouldn’t be required to be the focal point of offensive creativity like Franz Beckenbauer from yesteryear.  More so, Atalanta version would be much more focused on providing support on defense, filling up open gaps left by marauding defenders, and helping to keep a tightly knit group at the back.  Often Atalanta’s double pivot undertakes these same roles, but it can be much more difficult for a de Roon or Freuler to react and anticipate what is going on behind them.  Instead, someone who can read the match unfold in front of him can realistically make much quicker and proactive decisions that prevent fast breaks and transitional nightmares before they even begin.  Atalanta does this somewhat already, with the central defender in the middle of the three often hanging further back, but this guy is still committed all out in the press; Palomino’s positioning on the Caputo goal suggests as much.  Atalanta still gets beat enough with aggressive center back positioning that a tweak that takes his foot off the gas a bit may make all the difference.

This role wouldn’t totally negate the press and with him floating around the pitch in merriment.  As the ringleader of the defense, he would still need to guarantee the defense is keeping its shape, and ensure a proper offside trap is kept.  The problem with this role is the requirement being asked of the person playing it.  He needs to be a good one on one defender, possess elite positional awareness, aggressive, quick enough to stave off counter attacks, and have a good foot to initiate attacks through a long ball.  Fortunately for Atalanta’s sake, it already has one player that has the chops to adopt to this role, Teun Koopmeiners.

Atalanta’s Swiss Army Knife

Koopmeiners’s influence on offensive play is already common knowledge, but his defensive skills are underrated and strong enough for him to adapt.  While not a true centerback, he possesses good height at 186 centimeters and has good speed to keep up with Serie A attackers that are burners.  Most importantly he has the leadership abilities to marshal a defense to be prepared for everything bad that can happen during a loss in possession.  And if there’s one thing Atalanta needs, it is some sort of calming presence when proceedings begin to go haywire.

Let’s take one goal from above and see how a deeper Koopmeiner’s presence potentially could alter the outcome.  I’ll choose the Villarreal goal for its lasting bitterness.  Let’s assume Koopmeiners replaced Toloi, shifts to the middle of the defense, and is paired in the back three with Demiral and Palomino.

Stifling This Counter Attack

Here’s a screenshot of when Demiral freezes and loses possession to the Villarreal’s Dani Parejo who one-times a pass to Danjuma. Firstly, let’s make the assumptions that Demiral is making this run from the same position and Koopmeiners would have switched positions to be further on the right side of the pitch.

  1. Marten de Roon is left in no man’s land, and unfortunately cannot have much influence on the play to provide cover. Instead of moving off to the left, it would have been better for him to starting working backwards closer to Danjuma.
  2. Rafael Toloi is left flatfooted. Now this is where Koopmeiners comes into play. As the marshal, he would recognize Demiral’s run, and begin to track back along the arrow to cover the middle of the pitch that is now left unoccupied. Ideally Koopmeiners is already closer to this position as he has less liberty to work his way forward.
  3. As soon as Danjuma recognizes possession will be gained by Villarreal, he is off. Toloi is way too far away to catch him, but realistically a deeper Koopmeiners would have already recognized this and closed down the position
  4. This is the ideal spot where Koopmeiners would have set up shop. Even if the ball does reach Danjuma, he doesn’t have a head start on the foot race, and most likely he would be dragged out to the left flank, giving Palomino more time to come back in support and cover any other runs.

It may be an avant-garde idea, but there is something to it.  As a continuation of the first few tactical pieces, an ideal Atalanta attack would not need to resort to plodding possession, and realistically doesn’t need ten men pressing if the press is set up properly and forces teams to the flanks.  The Atalanta libero provides that added level of safety to counterbalance the aggression that tends to be all over the pitch. Yin and yang, or fire and water, whatever you want to call it, but one player on the pitch whose duty is to be alert to danger may make all the difference in letting a team open up for a one on one chance or sniffing it out before it even unfolds.

Nick