In the previous article we discussed possession velocity, and how much more dangerous fast twitch possessions are than slow methodical marches up the pitch. Working the ball fast is all well and good, and if was so easy, then everyone and their Catenaccio loving nonno would love it. But unfortunately, oppositions are not stupid nor devoid of talent. There’s only so many opportunities per match to use a velocity-laced attack, so what happens with all the other possessions?
90 minutes is the perfect time for a football match. It’s not too long that it becomes an arduous war of attrition, but it’s not too short that it rewards teams that play consistent rather than up and down and let luck decide their fate. Again, possession velocity is great, but with so many possessions afforded to a team, you must have a plan with the ones that cannot propel you onto more obvious goal scoring chances. So, what are you to do? Maximize quantity.
According to OptaPro data from the 2016-2017 Premier League season, there are roughly 200 possessions per match, or 100 per squad (assume that each team shares the same amount of possession). Subtracting out 5-10 possession that may produce ones at speed, trying to figure out what do for the other 90 possessions is a daunting task. A team must have a plan. Aimless back passing among the center backs results in nothing of value. At the same time trying to work out a long stretch of passes each possession may yield more value than biding time, but it is incredibly difficult to consistently pull off any real chances.
Everyone can be in awe of a YouTube clip of a neatly packaged play that shows 9 or 10 players working the ball up the pitch, ending with a goal after 15 or 20 passes. But the law of averages tells us that a play like that is merely a highlight reel, and certainly should not be an expectation for a team to consistently produce. Having the stars align is so difficult to reproduce, especially once a defense is privy to what a team may do after it has attempted it multiple times. As a proxy, let’s look at pass completion percentage, and the odds that must be overcome just to get in an attacking position to score. It is difficult to find pass rate statistics, so let’s just use Atalanta’s pass percentage numbers from this year on short, medium and long passes (data from fbref.com).
Let’s assume that Atalanta conducts a possession that contains 8 short passes (87.9% completion), 5 medium (86.7% completion), and 1 long (62.9%). That’s 14 passes that must be completed in order to get a shot off on this hypothetical possession, with an 11% chance that all 14 passes are completed consecutively. Adding onto that, this doesn’t even consider the more even smaller chance that a pass is successfully completed inside an opponent’s box.
Honestly this second chart feels more reasonable with more difficult passes needing to be completed once a team enters the opponent’s defensive third (with easier possessions completed in its own defensive third). Let’s take this simulation, and assume that in 90 possessions, a shot is taken in 5.1% of possessions. That would amount to 4.6 possession leading to shots, and even with an aggressive xG assumption of 0.3 goals, leads to just 1.4 goals per 90 possessions (0.2 xG leads to only .9 goals per 90 possessions). Now none of this data is perfect, it’s just being used to illustrate how difficult it is to consistently score from building out of the back possession after possession – and of course not every possession would begin all the way back in the keeper’s box.
So given the tiny possibility of scoring through a methodical buildup, the solution again is to shorten the pitch. Spend as much time in the opposition’s area, so when a turnover does occur only half the pitch has to be traversed. And what’s the easiest way to make this happen? A good press of course. Now to set up a good press is easier said than done. The best teams that fans associate with the press, like Manchester City, Liverpool, and Bayern Munich are all elite clubs that have a unique combination of world class talent aligned to a good strategy. Not that a club like Atalanta, Torino, or Hellas Verona don’t have good players to employ such a strategy, it just requires – in my opinion – a much more regimented strategy.
The eye test confirms that Atalanta, Verona, or Torino can use a good press can make a match very problematic for the opposition, and when two teams that press are playing each other it often leads to very ugly matches (just look at the Verona vs. Atalanta match at the end of 2021). So what makes a press good? Its one thing to close on the ball when you’re hunkered down in your own end trying to stop a cross from entering the box but creating unforced errors in the most compromising positions can make a press cutthroat.
Again, take Ruslan Malinovskyi’s goal against Inter. The press exquisitely isolated Matteo Darmian in the corner giving him three feasible options: a) passing back to the keeper, b) kicking the ball off the defender to try and force a throw-in, or c) clear it and hope for an aerial duel victory. Unfortunately for Darmian and Inter, Jose Palomino was in a perfect position to win his 50/50 ball, spurring on a goal that took about six seconds after earning possession. The beauty of the play, besides the velocity at which it was conducted, was the shrinking of the pitch, not just vertically, but horizontally. Naturally Atalanta only had a handful of meters to enter the eighteen, but given the ball was forced into the middle of the pitch it let Atalanta begin possession in the coveted middle of the pitch in order to create offense down the center of the pitch, the left flank, or the right flank.
Recreating this time and again is tough, but a spirited front line can go a long way in making a press successful. Again, going back to Hellas Verona, the Gialloblu has five players in the top 16 this season in possession won in the opposition’s third. Antonin Barak, Darko Lazovic, Gianluca Caprari, Giovanni Simeone, and Ivan Ilic would not be called elite defenders by most, but the energy and tenacity they consistently employ puts them on the receiving end of a lot of good fortune. They make their luck, and the hard work has paid off for Hellas this year, who are fifth in the Serie A in goals scored.
On top of a hard working and hustling front line, placing the defense in compromising positions from the get go can also help to facilitate the press. Back to the Malinovskyi goal, I already mentioned how Matteo Darmian was in a spot that was naturally difficult to create any real threat. Consistently pinning a defense in towards the flanks can help maximize compromising positions; as it, takes the ball away from holding midfielders or a more adept ball playing center back, and it constricts the size of playing field for the ballhandler, minimizing his options. To push the opposition towards the flank, packing the middle of the pitch once possession is lost is a good starting point. Man marking dangermen like Marcelo Brozovic and Manuel Locatelli can force teams to relent and dish off passes to less skilled ball handlers.
No here’s where the idea may get a bit controversial. Not every offensive possession is going to be a winner, and sometimes it makes sense to just cut your losses early. So if a club sees the writing on the wall and realizes a possession may ultimately end in failure – why not lose early to maximize the reward for the next possession? Steering the ball towards compromising areas of the pitch, while individual players begin to get a headstart in their marking duties for the press, could make the following possession much more fruitful. If a poor ballhandler is trapped in the corner, but he has minimal outlets to ease pressure, the odds of winning back possession in a favorable position feel like they would be much more positive. Essentially it’s a take one step back to move two steps forward philosophy. Offbeat? Maybe. Productive? Quite possibly!
But given this is about maximizing possession volume, let’s tie it all together. In fact its quite easy, and frankly doesn’t take rocket science to figure it out. I hope this just illustrates a point this is a bit challenging to regurgitate succinctly. A good press establishes two positive outcomes. First, it permits a team to win the ball back in a more favorable part of the pitch – skipping past long strings of possession (illustrated in the charts at the top). Second, it ignites speedy possessions discussed in the first part of the series – due to the shortened pitch and the propensity to catch a defense out of position.
However, it’s still important to remember it’s a numbers game. Not every defensive possession is going to turn into a well-executed press, especially against clubs with exquisite ballhandlers and passers. Yet, going throw the rigors of setting up a press will undoubtedly make volume possession not just quantifiably gratifying but also in terms of quality. Over 90 minutes of a match, a club may as well try something to steer the odds in its favor and force the mistakes rather than wait for them to happen.
Up to this point we’ve garnered that possession velocity in a vacuum is desirable. Similarly, and independently of that, a good press can elicit possession velocity and make volume possession more fruitful. We have a pretty good strategy established, and at a high level makes a lot of sense. But for every good strategy there’s always someone waiting to make a counter move. Atalanta knows all too well about the dangers of a good counterattack – so learning how to compliment aggression with a security blanket is essential to smothering an opponent. Until next time, Forza Dea!!!
